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Abstract 
We investigate the measurement of sociopolitical consensus in direct democracies by 
means of three novel Consensus Indexes. They are special cases of Approval Consensus 
Measures, a tool from social choice that evaluates the degree of cohesiveness in a fixed 
group of agents that vote on a list of issues. We perform a basic dynamic analysis of the 
Swiss votes in popular initiatives, in periods marked by the main reforms and political 
crisis along those years. We provide novel quantitative arguments to validate the 
hypotheses that those reorganizations had an impact in terms of sociopolitical consensus 
during the last decade in comparison with prior stages. In addition we study the 
cumulative consensus in Italian referendums since 1974. We also investigate to what 
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extent our indexes reflect the existence of periods in the development of referendums as 
a constitutional praxis. 
Keywords: consensus indexes, sociopolitical consensus, direct democracy. 
JEL classification: H79, D79. 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the measurement of sociopolitical consensus by means of a 
novel tool from social choice theory named Approval Consensus Measures. These 
measures evaluate the degree of cohesiveness in a group of agents that vote on a list of 
issues. Direct democracies, with their tradition about popular votes, provide a natural 
field of application where data proliferate. In a direct democracy the participation of the 
citizenship is not limited to electing the highest state bodies, but also the citizens can 
determine whether and if so which specific issues should be submitted to a decision of 
the People. Henceforth we propose three novel Consensus Indexes that take advantage 
of the particular structure of the popular votes (whether or not the population is fixed, 
and the information about the ballots). 
Despite the importance of the topic, little evidence of comparable indicators exists to fill 
the current gap in knowledge regarding the measurement of sociopolitical consensus. 
The informational basis of our analysis is the result of popular votes in a political entity. 
In doing this we are inspired by Lipsitz (1968), who claims: “Political consensus 
involves kinds of agreements that are politically relevant. [...] Two other views of 
consensus [...] have been developed and employed in different political contexts as well. 
The first of these is consensus as legitimacy: approval of the existing government and/or 
its directives. Understood in this sense, consensus is seen to be one of the key elements 
in governmental stability.” Building on the latter sense of the concept we propose to use 
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data on the approval of political directives by citizens in order to produce comparable 
indicators of sociopolitical consensus. Firstly we present a general tool of analysis to 
deal with different models. Then we propose indexes that take advantage of the 
information provided by those qualitatively different formal models. Finally we use 
them to perform an empirical analysis with data about the popular initiatives in 
Switzerland in the 1991-2012 period, and about Italian referendums since the 1947 
constitution. The first analysis has a fixed population of agents (the cantons) while the 
second one has variable population (the individual voters). 
Our purpose should not be mistaken with other analyses of indexes for the purpose of 
comparing countries on consensus vs. majoritarian scales (cf., Lijphart, 1984, 1999). 
These are useful for example, to evaluate the macroeconomic consequences of different 
types of institutions. According to Lijphart's criteria and other arguments from 
comparative democracy research, Switzerland, together with Belgium, are widely seen 
as the most typical cases of consensus democracies (Lijphart, 1999, pp. 33, 34ff., 249), 
a concept with a precise meaning in political science. These considerations make the 
Swiss example especially attractive and challenging. 
 
1.1 Empirical analysis of Switzerland's data 
In Switzerland there are two different ways to consult the people, depending on the 
nature of the issue: the popular initiative, and the referendum. Swiss referendums are 
popular votes called to challenge a piece of legislation already approved by the Federal 
Assembly. If any person or group opposed to the new law manages to collect 50,000 
signatures within 100 days of the official publication of the proposed legislation, the 
voters as a whole are given the chance to decide. The authorities are obliged to hold a 
referendum if the legislation involves an amendment to the constitution initiated by the 
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government, or any proposal for Switzerland to sign a major international agreement 
that cannot be rescinded. In addition, any Swiss citizen has the right to propose new 
legislation by launching an initiative (a popular initiative), although normally initiatives 
come from pressure groups rather than individuals. If they gather over 100,000 
signatures within 18 months in support of the proposal, it must be put to a nation-wide 
vote. Initiatives have been held on a variety of issues, although they were intended to 
deal with constitutional matters exclusively. 
Since popular votes do not always proceed from the Parliament or the Government, but 
they directly come from the citizens, they are regarded as the driving force of direct 
democracy. We focus on this element as an evidence for the measurement of 
sociopolitical consensus. 
In the case of an initiative or a mandatory referendum in Switzerland, there must be a 
"double majority" for it to pass: both a majority of the people as a whole, and a majority 
of the cantons, must approve it. 
Our target is the investigation of the coherence of the votes across cantons, that is, we 
build on the data about which issues were approved or rejected in each of the cantons. 
To that purpose we use information from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. Besides, 
in order to perform a basic dynamic analysis we have studied the Swiss cantonal votes 
in periods marked by the main reforms and political crisis along those years. The federal 
constitution was completely amended in 1999. For the first time, the cantons used the 
possibility of calling a nationwide vote in order to challenge a decision of the 
Parliament in 2003. The result was that a new fiscal equalization scheme was approved 
in 2004, which meant the greatest reform to Swiss federalism since the federal state was 
created. Later on, Linder and Iff (2011, p. 77) speak of a short "crisis of consensus 
democracy" in 2008. Around that time, Vatter (2008, p. 3) had studied whether "(t)he 
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considerable political changes and institutional reforms of the last decade lead to 
expectations that (....) Switzerland no longer corresponds to the extreme example of a 
consensus democracy". In a similar vein we intend to provide novel quantitative 
arguments to examine the hypotheses that those reorganizations had an impact in terms 
of sociopolitical consensus. The results show evidences that the same phenomenon has 
happened during the last decade in comparison with prior stages. 
 
1.2 Empirical analysis of Italy's data 
In Italy there are two kinds of legally binding referendums, and there are consultative 
referendums too. Since the approval of the legislation that regulates them in the early 
1970s, a total of 66 popular referendums, 2 constitutional referendums, and 1 
consultative referendum were held. Popular referendums are called only to decide if an 
existing law must be totally or partially abolished (consultazione referendarie 
abrogative). Constitutional referendums are confirmatory (the voters decide on whether 
they want to keep or abolish the law) but contrarily to popular referendums, they are not 
subject to any quorum. 
Constitutional experts concur with the distinction of periods in the development of 
abrogative referendums as a constitutional praxis. Building on De Vergottini (2006), we 
distinguish four periods. From 1974 (when the first referendum after the 1947 
constitution was held) to 1985, there were 9 popular referendums on fundamental 
individual rights. In all cases the citizens decided against repealing the existing laws, 
and the electorate replicates the distribution of positions in the parliament. From 1987 to 
1995, 30 popular referendums were held, of which 10 ended in approval (i.e., the 
respective laws were abrogated). The resource to referendums started to escape from the 
control of the parliament. From 1997 to 2009, 23 popular referendums were held but 
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they all were invalidated because quorum was not met. Besides there were 2 
constitutional referendums and 1 consultative referendum. Here the distinctive feature is 
that the resource to abstaining has hampered the role of the proposers of the 
referendums. Finally, in 2011 four popular referendums were held and they all were 
approved (i.e., the quorum was met and the four regulations were repealed), which 
somehow hints a return to the second period. We investigate to what extent our indexes 
are responsive to the existence of these periods, and also we examine the evolution of 
the sociopolitical consensus along time, understood as the coherence in the expression 
of the votes in past referendums. 
 
2. Consensus: Conceptualization and proposal of indexes under dichotomous 
opinions 
 
2.1 Notations 
When we are concerned with a fixed group of N individual or fictitious agents (like 
cantons or states in a federal system) who express a dichotomous opinion (like yes-no) 
on k issues, and we know their responses or votes, we can gather them in a binary 
matrix M. This means a matrix where each cell has either a 1 or a 0, two digits that 
symbolize each of the possible answers or results. Agents are given by rows, and issues 
by columns. Therefore if we look at row 1 then we have the opinions of agent 1 on each 
of the possible issues. Likewise, if we look at column 1 then we have the opinions of all 
agents on the first issue. Following Alcantud et al. (2013a), these matrices are called 
approval profiles. We adopt the voting terminology for convenience although the 
model adapts e.g., to polls or surveys as well. 
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Example 1. For this illustrative toy example we refer to some results in the traditionally 
called “half-cantons”2. Each of these six Swiss cantons has only one seat on the Council 
of States - there are two seats for each of the other cantons-, and half a cantonal vote in 
popular referendums about constitutional amendments.  
We consider the results of the six “half-cantons” in three popular initiatives voted on 
March 11, 2012. The first initiative wanted to limit the building of secondary 
residencies in each municipality in Switzerland, and it was accepted. The second 
initiative aimed at establishing a new tax instrument to stimulate housing savings in 
order to promote first homeownership or to finance works of energy-saving measures 
and environment protection. The third initiative was called “six holiday weeks for 
everybody”. The latter two initiatives were rejected. Table 1 collects the relevant 
aspects of the results. According to our convention, a 1 means that the half-canton 
approved the initiative, and a 0 means that it was rejected. 
Table 1 
Cantonal results of three popular initiatives voted on March 11, 2012 in the half-cantons 
(ballot number: 555, 556 and 557). Source: http://www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch/ 
 I II III 
Appenzell Ausserrhoden 1 0 0 
Appenzell Innerrhoden 0 0 0 
Basel-Stadt 1 0 0 
Basel-Landschaft 1 1 0 
Obwalden 0 0 0 
Nidwalden 0 0 0 
Number of half-cantons 6 6 6 
                                                        
2Appenzell Ausserrhoden and Appenzell Innerrhoden, Basel-Stadt and Basel-Landschaft, Obwalden and 
Nidwalden. 
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Following the notation just explained above, these results can be reduced to the 
following 6x3 matrix: 




















=
000
000
011
001
000
001
M
 
However on occasions we do not know the exact configuration of each ballot, but 
aggregate gross data are available. It can also happen that the population of voters varies 
with the issues. Consider the following example: 
Example 2. Three referendums on reforming the electoral law were held in Italy on 21-
22 June 2009. The referendums were not valid because they did not reach the necessary 
quorum of 50% voters. Table 2 collects the relevant aspects of the results. 
 
Table 2 
Results of the 2009 Italian electoral law referendum. Source: Italian Secretary of State, 
Archivio Storico delle Elezioni (http://elezionistorico.interno.it/) 
 I II III 
For (percentage) 77.63 77.68 87.00 
Against 
(percentage) 
22.37 22.32 13.00 
Valid votes 10,372,226 10,362,230 10,908,329 
 
Cases like Example 2 suggest that it is convenient to produce indicators solely on the 
basis of the relative support to each of the issues. This imposes less restrictions than the 
appeal to approval profiles: we only need what we call relative-approval profiles, that 
is, k-dimensional vectors ),,( 111 krrV K= that capture the proportion of 1-opinions on 
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each of the k issues. Thus the outcome of Example 2 boils down to 
)87.0 ,7768.0 ,7763.0( =V . Obviously, both 01 =jr  and 11 =
j
r  indicate unanimity on 
issue j. Approval profiles can be transformed into relative-approval profiles easily: jr1  is 
simply the sum of the elements in column j divided by N. The outcome of Example 1 
could be simplified as )0, 6/1 ,2/1( =V . 
Populated relative-approval profiles provide an intermediate model in between 
approval profiles and relative-approval profiles. They permit to incorporate the 
information on the size of the population that gave their opinion on the respective 
issues. Formally, they are 2xk matrices P whose cell ),1( j  contains 
j
r1 , the relative 
support to issue j, and cell ),2( j  contains the number of people that voted on that issue, 
denoted jN . With each P we associate kNNv ++= K1 , that is, the total number of 
votes cast by the voters on the different issues. 
The information in Example 2 addresses to the populated relative-approval profile 








=





= 321
3
1
2
1
1
1
 
10,908,32910,362,23010,372,226
87.0077.6877.63
NNN
rrr
P  
According to our notation, .v 31,642,785    10,908,329    10,362,230  226,372,10 =++=  
The information in Example 1 addresses to the populated relative-approval profile  
 
666
013






=P
 
According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, consensus of opinion can be conceived 
of as group solidarity in sentiment and belief. Henceforth there must be groups with 
larger solidarity in opinions than others. How do we quantify their respective solidarity 
in beliefs? We study some proposals in the remaining of this section. 
Assigning an index with each approval profile seems a suitable way to measure 
consensus in cases like the one described above. Because it seems natural to conceive of 
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'full consensus or its fractions' such number should lie in the interval [0,1]. Alcantud et 
al. (2013a) argues that a minimum set of properties must be requested, which do not 
guarantee good performance by themselves. These properties are: (i) an index of 1 is 
equivalent to unanimity on all issues, (ii) the index is independent of the names of the 
agents (anonymity), and (iii) the index is independent of the heading of the questions 
(neutrality). An index that verifies these constrains is called an approval consensus 
measure or ACM for simplicity. 
We proceed to describe some proposals of indexes that use information from the various 
degrees of refinement that the modelizations of the dichotomous group opinions 
convey. 
 
2.2 Proposal of indexes: earlier literature 
2.2.1 The simple approval consensus measure 
The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary defines consensus as “an opinion that all 
members of a group agree with”. If we adhere to this conception then a suitable measure 
of the consensus in a society during a certain period, is the proportion of alternatives 
they unanimously agreed with when they voted along such period. This basic approach 
produces a naive example of a consensus measure, namely the simple measure 1C
studied by Alcantud et al. (2013a). It measures the consensus in a relative-approval 
profile by the proportion of alternatives that have received a unanimous answer. In 
practice, this is the number of issues on which there is unanimity (i.e., there is either a 0 
or a 1 in the corresponding cell) divided by the total number of alternatives (i.e., the 
dimension of the vector). We refer to this indicator as the simple consensus index. In 
the situation of Example 1 we have 
3
1)(1 =VC . 
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2.2.2 The pairwise approval consensus measure 
In no society, however consensual, is the consensus ever universally shared (Shils, 
1968). Consequently, Alcantud et al. (2013b) builds on indexes that better capture the 
complexity of our framework. The first one, namely the pairwise ACM or pC , has an 
intuitive description: it evaluates the consensus by the probability that a randomly 
selected issue has received the same vote, be it approval or disapproval, by two 
randomly chosen agents. To this purpose, we must use the information on the 
corresponding populated relative-approval profile P in order to compute the following 
expression:  
.
1
)1(21)(11)(
1
11
1
2
11 ∑∑
==
−
−
−=
−
−=
k
j
j
jjjk
j N
jjjjj
p N
rNr
kC
NrNNr
k
PC
j
 
We refer to this indicator as the pairwise consensus index. When each jN is 
sufficiently large this expression can be approximated by 
∑
=
=
−−≈
kj
j
jj
p rrk
PC
1
11 )1(
21)(
 
because in such case 1
1
≈
−
j
j
N
N
 
for each j. Therefore if we only know information on 
the relative-approval profile V of the society, but we also know that the number of votes 
on each issue is large (as is the case of Example 2), then the latter expression produces a 
nice approximation of the real appraisal of the consensus by the PACM. 
Remark 1. Because 
1
)1()( 111
−
−= j
j
jjj
N
N
rrrV
 is an inverted parabola with vertex in  
⇒=
2
1
1
j
r 




≤
2
1)( 1 VrV j , for each j. 
Therefore, 
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∑
=
≥−=
k
j
j
p rVk
PC
1
1 )(
21)( .)1(2
11)1(4
21
1 1
∑ ∑
= =
−
−=
−
−
k
j
k
j
j
j
j
j
N
N
kN
N
k
 
For large jN s, like in the Italian case, )(PC p  is bounded below by an amount that is 
only slightly smaller than 
2
1
 . 
 
2.3 New indexes of consensus with unknown or variable population 
The simple measure 1C  applies to these cases too: unanimous verdicts on an issue are 
identified by either 0 or 1 in the corresponding position of the relative-approval profile. 
For example, if )1.0 ,3.0 ,0 ,6.0 ,1(=V then .5/2)(1 =VC  But if we seek more 
meaningful indexes then we must observe that pC , the PACM, is unsuitable for this 
more general framework because the evaluation by pC  is affected by the size of the 
population (v., Alcantud et al., 2013b). To overcome this difficulty, these authors 
propose a technical modification of the PACM, namely the Modified PACM or 
MPACM. For the purpose of comparing consensual performance these two indexes are 
equivalent. However we do not know of any intuitive meaning for the MPACM index 
that permits to derive qualitative arguments. For these reasons we here propose two new 
indexes that are both intuitively easy to interpret and designed for data with variable or 
unknown population. 
Definition 1. The Majoritarian ACM, mµ , evaluates the consensus in a relative-
approval profile V by the probability that the vote of a randomly chosen agent on a 
randomly selected issue is supported by a majority of the agents. We say that an opinion 
on an issue is supported by a majority of the agents if at least half of them have such 
opinion on the issue, be it approval or disapproval. Formally: 
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}1,{1)( 11
1
jj
kj
j
m rrmaxk
V −= ∑
=
=
µ
 
We refer to this indicator as the majoritarian consensus index. 
If the information on the populated relative-approval profile of the society is available, 
then we can use it in order to give a more accurate assessment of the consensus in the 
following terms: 
Definition 2. The Weighted Majoritarian ACM, wµ , evaluates the consensus in a 
populated relative-approval profile P by the probability that a randomly chosen vote 
(among the universe of all votes by any agent on any issue) coincides with the vote cast 
by a majority of the agents on the same issue. Formally: 
)}1(,{1})1,{(1)( 1
1
111
1
jj
kj
j
jjjj
kj
j
j
w rNrNmax
v
rrmaxN
v
P −⋅⋅=−⋅= ∑∑
=
=
=
=
µ
 
We refer to this indicator as the weighted majoritarian consensus index. It is clear 
that when all the jN coincide, the majoritarian consensus index and the weighted 
majoritarian consensus index must coincide too. 
Remark 2. It is simple to check that the values of the majoritarian and the weighted 
majoritarian consensus indexes are bounded below by 0.5.  
To put some examples, when we compute the value of the Majoritarian index 
mµ  for 
)1.0 ,3.0 ,0 ,6.0 ,1(=V we obtain 84.0
5
9.07.016.01)( =++++=Vmµ . In the situation 
of Example 1 we had ),0, 6/1 ,2/1( =V thus 7778.0 
3
16/52/1)( ≈++=Vmµ . Let us 
now consider Example 2, i.e., 
)870776807763.0( ., ., V = and 





=
10,908,32910,362,23010,372,226
87.0077.6877.63
P .  
Now  
 14 
8077.0
3
87.07768.07763.0)( =++=Vmµ
 
and 
8087.087.0329,908,107768.0230,362,107763.0226,372,10)( =++=
vvv
Pwµ ,  
where 785,642,31 =v  is the total number of votes cast. 
 
3. The data  
Shils (1968) says: “Abstract or general ethical and political beliefs (”principles”) can 
enter into consensus insofar as they affect agreement or disagreement on particular 
issues of legitimacy, distribution, selection, and so on. [...] The beliefs which enter into 
consensus are not clearly articulated or systematically ordered.” To avoid this 
indeterminacy, for our analysis of sociopolitical consensus in Switzerland we 
concentrate on the data about the popular votes in the 1991-2012 period provided by the 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office (http://www.bfs.admin.ch). Table 3 summarizes the 
number of popular votes per year that produced a unanimous answer across cantons. 
Also in Appendix A, Table A-1 collects broader information on the cantonal results of 
each of the 201 votes held in such period: for each particular vote, it gives the number 
of cantons that approved the issue. 
Table 3 
Yearly number of popular votes voted in the 1991-2012 period in Switzerland, and 
yearly number of unanimous answers in such votes. 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Unanimous answers 1 4 9 5 2 5 4 6 4 9 9 
Initiatives per year 4 16 16 13 7 9 5 10 10 16 11 
 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Unanimous answers 2 7 6 1 3 0 6 4 4 0 6 97 
Initiatives per year 9 11 13 5 6 2 10 8 7 1 12 201 
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Also with the purpose of estimating sociopolitical consensus in Italy, we use the 
information detailed in Appendix B, Table B-1. 
 
4. The empirical results: computation of indexes 
Table 3 permits to calculate that the simple consensus index for the 1991-2012 period in 
the Swiss analysis is 4826.0
201
97)(1 ≈=VC . To see this we observe that in 97 out of 
the 201 votes held, all cantons gave the same answer (be it approval or rejection). 
An analysis of the full data on the votes of the cantons for that period (cf., Table A-1, 
Appendix A) shows that the corresponding pairwise consensus indexes 
8350.0)( ≈PC p , and the majoritarian consensus index is 8858.0)( ≈Vmµ . It coincides 
with the weighted majoritarian consensus index because the number of agents (the 
cantons) is fixed. 
In order to perform a basic dynamical analysis motivated by our question on the 
possible evolution of sociopolitical consensus in Switzerland, we have subdivided the 
data in four periods, namely 1991-1998, 1999-2003, 2004-2008 and 2009-2012. In each 
of these subperiods we have reproduced the analysis above. Table 4 collects the results 
inclusive of the indicators for the whole period: 
Table 4 
Value of the indicators in the periods 1991-1998, 1999-2003, 2004-2008, 2009-2012, 
and the whole 1991-2012, for the data about popular votes in Switzerland by cantons. 
 1991-1998 1999-2003 2004-2008 2009-2012 1991-2012 
Simple 0.45 0.5439 0.4444 0.5 0.4826 
Pairwise 0.8288 0.8561 0.8240 0.8242 0.8350 
Majoritarian 0.8827 0.8988 0.8793 0.8764 0.8858 
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In order to draw consequences on sociopolitical consensus, we believe that the simple 
measure is too naive and only the more sophisticated pairwise and (weighted) 
majoritarian indexes should be studied. Both coincide in pointing out a decline after the 
2003 year, with restricted indexes well below the values of the whole period. 
We have first performed a dynamical analysis, using the cumulative data of the Italian 
referendums since 1974 (see Table 5), as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Table 5 
Value of the indicators using aggregate data since 1974, for the data about Italian 
referendums. 
Aggregate 
until year p
C
 
mµ  wµ  
1974 0.517150 0.592600 0.592600 
1978 0.555131 0.640433 0.640026 
1981 0.647496 0.746200 0.745276 
1985 0.631522 0.723644 0.721331 
1987 0.647915 0.749050 0.744272 
1989 0.657337 0.757800 0.754313 
1990 0.691798 0.785939 0.774116 
1991 0.703563 0.794874 0.783666 
1993 0.705660 0.797630 0.790616 
1995 0.648020 0.731241 0.733855 
1997 0.646888 0.734780 0.735464 
1999 0.651099 0.738619 0.738846 
2000 0.643755 0.734785 0.736659 
2001 0.641875 0.733100 0.735514 
2003 0.646063 0.737600 0.737760 
2005 0.653283 0.745285 0.741789 
2006 0.651222 0.743150 0.739486 
2009 0.653161 0.746129 0.740974 
2011 0.667719 0.757922 0.755343 
 
Now we can observe that the majoritarian consensus index does not coincide with the 
weighted majoritarian consensus index because the number of voters varies with the 
issue. 
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Figure 1. Value of the indicators for the cumulative data from the Italian referendums 
since 1974. Source: Italian Secretary of State, Archivio Storico delle Elezioni. 
 
We can also perform another dynamical analysis to study the possible evolution of 
sociopolitical consensus in Italy, distinguishing four periods in the development of 
abrogative referendums, as we have explained in the introductory section. 
 
Table 6 
Value of the indicators in the periods 1974-1985, 1987-1995, 1997-2009, 2011, for the 
data about Italian referendums. 
1974-1985 1987-1995 1997-2009 2011 
Pairwise 0,631522  0,652969 0,660873 0,904280 
Majoritarian 0,723644  0,733520 0,768462 0,949550 
Weighted  0,721331  0,738170 0,763143 0,949551 
0,40
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Figure 2. Value of the indicators in the periods 1974-1985, 1987-1995, 1997-2009, 
2011, for the data about Italian referendums. Source: Italian Secretary of State, Archivio 
Storico delle Elezioni. 
 
We observe that the first period produced the smallest consensus across periods, 
reflecting the controversial nature of the issues put to a vote. The period with the 
highest consensus (before the current, unended period) corresponds to the years during 
which the resource to abstention on one side of the electorate corrupted the expressed 
opinions. 
 
5. Conclusions and final comments 
We have introduced some indexes of sociopolitical consensus that rely on the 
evaluation of the cohesiveness of the agents (either representative, like cantons, or 
actual voters) in popular votes. They differ in that they use different kinds of 
information, and that they build on different interpretations of how 'fractions' of full 
consensus should be interpreted. We show empirical evidence (from two countries with 
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a tradition for popular votes, namely Switzerland and Italy), that they can be used to 
assess sociopolitical consensus. 
Vatter (2008, p. 31) concludes that "Switzerland is on the way to becoming an average 
consensus democracy", showing "pronounced elements of assimilation and 
normalization of the original special case". Our analysis (cf., Table 4) shows that in 
terms of sociopolitical consensus, there are some evidences that the same phenomenon 
has happened during the last decade in comparison with prior stages. 
With respect to Italy, the division in identifiable periods of the development of 
referendums has been captured by all these indexes as was expected. 
Other applications related with political analysis are hinted in Alcantud et al. (2013a). 
In this paper the predictions about the 2012 presidential elections in USA made by 
polling agencies are the subject of inspection. Only a toy example is provided, but a 
more extensive analysis can be performed on the basis of the same argument. With this 
application we have an example of a possible interpretation of approval consensus 
measures in terms other than voting situations. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table A-1. Results of the popular votes in the 1991-2012 period in Switzerland: number 
of cantons where the issue was approved. Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
(http://www.bfs.admin.ch) 
Year 1991 1991 1991 1991 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 
Yes 26 2 3 22 
 
Year 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Yes 1 4 20 20 21 0 25 26 25 23 18 0 1 26 17 8 
 
Year 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Yes 18 26 0 8 5 26 26 26 26 26 25 21 25 23 0 0 
 
Year 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Yes 24 26 24 19 26 12 11 4 26 13 13 0 26 
 
Year 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Yes 10 4 3 26 21 0 7 
 
Year 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Yes 26 26 4 26 17 26 3 12 0 
 
Year 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 5 
Yes 0 0 26 16 0 
 
Year 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Yes 26 0 0 18 0 5 22 26 0 23 
 
Year 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Yes 24 26 3 21 14 26 26 16 0 6 
 
Year 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Yes 26 0 0 0 0 24 0 5 3 0 0 6 7 4 0 24 
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Year 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Yes 0 0 0 11 11 26 26 0 0 0 0 
 
Year 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Yes 13 0 24 0 6 7 11 15 22 
 
Year 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Yes 26 26 26 26 1 0 0 3 1 2 0 
 
Year 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Yes 0 0 24 0 0 0 6 7 10 11 23 25 26 
 
Year 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 5 
Yes 12 19 19 26 7 
 
Year 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Yes 26 3 26 26 15 25 
 
Year 2007 2007 
Initiative 1 2 
Yes 2 22 
 
Year 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Yes 0 18 1 0 0 20 4 0 0 26 
 
Year 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Yes 22 26 10 13 26 26 0 22 
 
Year 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Yes 26 0 0 18 20 0 4 
 
Year 2011 
Initiative 1 
Yes 6 
 
Year 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Yes 15 5 0 26 6 0 0 0 26 10 1 24 
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APPENDIX B 
Table B-1. Results of the Italian referendums in the 1946-2012 period. Source: Italian 
Secretary of State, Archivio Storico delle Elezioni (http://elezionistorico.interno.it/) 
 
Year 1974 1978 1978 
Initiative 1 1 2 
Yes (%) 40.74 23.54 43.59 
No (%) 59.26 76.46 56.41 
Valid votes 32,295,858 31,439,425 31,410,378 
         
Year 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1985 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 5 1 
Yes (%) 14.88 22.63 14.08 11.58 32.00 45.68 
No (%) 85.12 77.37 85.92 88.42 68.00 54.32 
Valid votes 31,161,476 31,445,673 31,418,599 30,984,904 31,625,120 33,845,643 
         
Year 1987 1987 1987 1987 1987 1989 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 5 1 
Yes (%) 80.21 85.04 80.57 79.71 71.86 88.03 
No (%) 19.79 14.96 19.43 20.29 28.14 11.97 
Valid votes 25,896,355 26,007,745 26,043,929 25,866,511 26,157,518 33,122,742 
         
Year 1990 1990 1990 1991 
Initiative 1 2 3 1 
Yes (%) 92.20 92.28 93.51 95.57 
No (%) 7.80 7.72 6.49 4.43 
Valid votes 19,295,231 19,397,886 19,557,798 28,144,887 
         
Year 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Yes (%) 82.57 55.36 90.25 89.80 90.11 82.74 70.23 82.28 
No (%) 17.43 44.64 9.75 10.20 9.89 17.26 29.77 17.72 
Valid votes 34,412,643 34,785,730 34,598,906 34,571,043 34,663,796 34,971,387 34,638,511 34,672,426 
         
Year 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Yes (%) 43.07 44.34 43.59 49.97 62.14 64.68 
No (%) 56.93 55.66 56.41 50.03 37.86 35.32 
Valid votes 26,978,610 27,030,205 26,875,869 24,597,023 24,294,888 24,238,425 
         
Year 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 
Initiative 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Yes (%) 63.68 54.90 35.63 56.24 49.40 37.40 
No (%) 36.32 45.10 64.37 43.76 50.60 62.60 
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Valid votes 24,142,229 25,022,962 24,534,037 24,796,712 24,607,219 24,994,779 
Year 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 
Initiative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Yes (%) 74.06 71.69 80.90 83.55 65.52 85.58 66.85 
No (%) 25.94 28.31 19.10 16.45 34.48 14.42 33.15 
Valid votes 12,880,352 13,336,669 13,518,329 12,909,521 12,702,450 13,040,846 12,848,609 
         
Year 1999 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 
Initiative 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Yes (%) 91.52 71.06 82.02 70.57 69.00 75.22 33.36 61.82 
No (%) 8.48 28.94 17.98 29.43 31.00 24.78 66.64 38.18 
Valid votes 23,121,888 14,078,269 14,189,487 12,930,715 13,387,954 13,561,179 14,757,427 13,963,498 
         
Year 2001 2003 2003 2005 2005 2005 2005 2006 
Initiative 1 1 2 1 2 3 4 1 
Yes (%) 64.21 86.74 85.53 88.03 88.78 87.73 77.38 38.71 
No (%) 35.79 13.26 14.47 11.97 11.22 12.27 22.62 61.29 
Valid votes 16,250,101 12,191,080 12,195,075 12,204,927 12,187,197 12,155,167 12,136,056 25,753,782 
        
Year 2009 2009 2009 2011 2011 2011 2011 
Initiative 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 
Yes (%) 77.63 77.68 87.00 95.35 95.80 94.05 94.62 
No (%) 22.37 22.32 13.00 4.65 4.20 5.95 5.38 
Valid votes 10,372,226 10,362,230 10,908,329 27,200,859 27,277,283 27,265,741 27,197,124 
 
Recall that the 0 or 1 values can be attached arbitrarily since they are just labels. This emphasizes the fact 
that our model applies to cases where a dichotomous choice must be made for all issues, which includes 
but is not limited to "yes-no" questions (v., Alcantud et al., 2013a). 
There was a previous referendum in 1946 where the Italians had to choose the institutional form of the 
State between “Republic” or “Monarchy”.  As a result a 54.27% of the voters chose Republic and the rest 
(45.73%) chose Monarchy. There were 23,437,143 valid votes. 
 
 
 
